Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives by unknown
Technology-Based Emission and Effluent
Standards and the Achievement of
Ambient Environmental Objectives
The Clean Air Act (CAA)l and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA)2 mandate both ambient environmental quality standards,
and technology-based emission or effluent standards4 for certain sources of
pollution. This Note demonstrates that the current use of technology-
based standards precludes the achievement of ambient standards at least
cost. It argues further that, in the context of this mixed regulatory system,
technology-based standards fail to promote any important non-economic
goals. As an alternative to the current system of dual standards, the Note
proposes a zoned marketable pollution rights scheme that would ensure
that ambient standards are met at least cost.
Because ambient environmental quality standards limit pollution con-
centration levels, they are a logical tool for the control of local pollutants,
whose harm is directly related to their concentrations in the biosphere.5
Ambient standards are therefore central to the structure of the CAA,6 and
will play an important role under the FWPCA after 19832 Ideally, these
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. An ambient standard sets a maximum pollutant concentration, as measured at a specific loca-
tion. Tietenberg, Transferable Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution:
A Survey and Synthesis, 56 LAND ECON. 391, 396 (1980). Under § 109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA),
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS) based on health and public welfare considerations, respectively. 42 U.S.C. §
7409 (Supp. III 1979). In addition, areas with high levels of air quality are subject to ambient stan-
dards more stringent than NAAQS under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479; see infra p. 806 (discussing PSD program).
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), water quality standards are established
on a case by case basis, pursuant to state laws, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976), or federal statutes and
regulations, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). There is, in addition, a federal water quality goal, which
will come into effect in 1983 and which mandates "fishable/swimmable" waters wherever attainable.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2); see also Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1285
(D.S.D. 1979).
4. Technology-based standards set quantitative limits on pollutant discharges. These limits are
based on the abatement capability of pollution control technology. Freeman, Air and Water Pollution
Policy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12, 53 (P. Portney ed. 1978). Technol-
ogy-based standards do not mandate the adoption of any particular technology. See infra p. 809; see
also infra notes 21-22 (discussing CAA emission and FWPCA effluent standards).
5. See Tietenberg, supra note 3, at 395-96. In contrast, the damage caused by global pollutants
depends solely on the aggregate volume of residuals discharged. Id. at 395 n.18.
6. All current proposals for the revision of the CAA, including the Reagan Administration's plan,
call for the retention of federally set health-based primary ambient air quality standards and welfare-
based secondary ambient air quality standards. See AMERICAN ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RE-
SEARCH, THE CLEAN AIR ACT: PROPOSALS FOR REVISIONS 10-11 (1981).
7. See supra note 3 (federal "fishable/swimmable" water quality goal to be implemented in
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standards should be set to maximize net social surplus? Setting optimal
ambient standards, however, is virtually impossible, because it requires
subjective estimates of the benefits of pollution control.' Accordingly, this
Note limits its scope to the design of an optimal system of environmental
regulation consistent with preestablished ambient standards.
I. Economic Considerations
A regulatory system that employs ambient standards is economically
optimal if it leads to the attainment of such standards at least cost. Tech-
nology-based standards are not cost-effective, either when used as the sole
means for attaining ambient standards or when employed as part of the
hybrid schemes of the CAA and the FWPCA.
A. Ambient Standards: Efficiency and Least Cost
In formal economic terms, there is an efficient degree of pollution con-
trol when the marginal cost of pollution abatement is equal to the margi-
nal benefit of abatement. 10 An efficient outcome can be achieved, for ex-
ample, by imposing a tax upon pollution discharges equal to the marginal
net damage produced by those discharges, where net damage is defined as
the difference between the total damage to society and the cost to the indi-
vidual polluter.1 The current reliance of the CAA and the FWPCA on
ambient standards set independently of economic considerations 2 pre-
cludes the systematic achievement of an efficient degree of pollution
control.
For the purpose of this Note, however, the economic desirability of a
pollution control system is determined by the degree to which it allocates
discharge units among polluters in a manner that meets ambient standards
1983). The EPA may attach more importance, in the future, to ambient water quality standards.
(1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 837.
8. Net social surplus is the difference between total benefits and total costs. E. MILLS, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 88 (1978).
9. Calculating the benefits of pollution control involves estimating such intangibles as the value of
human life, more desirable recreation sites, and breathing discomfort. Experts do not even agree on
the methodology that should be used to make such estimates, especially estimates concerning the value
of human life. See, e.g., M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE 28-47 (1980); Broome, Trying to
Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (1978); Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969);
Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J. POL. ECON. 687 (1971).
10. E. MILLS, supra note 8. This level of pollution control maximizes social surplus. Id.
11. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 135 (1975). The opti-
mal tax level is not equal to the marginal net damage the activity generates initially, but to the
damage the activity would cause if the resulting quantity of pollution had been adjusted to its optimal
level. Id. at 136.
12. The ambient standards relevant to this Note are based on health effects, see 42 U.S.C. § 7409
(Supp. III 1979) (primary ambient air quality standards), welfare considerations, see id. (secondary
ambient air quality standards), and uses, see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) (federal "fishable/swim-
mable" water quality goals); 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976) (state water quality standards).
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at least cost.'3 A cost-minimizing allocation will result in ideally efficient
pollution control only if the ambient standards themselves satisfy the gen-
eral conditions for economic efficiency. 14
The familiar economic condition that marginal cost equalization leads
to cost-effective allocations is inapplicable because the environmental im-
pact of a discharge depends on geographical location and inter-regional
effects.' 5 The equalization of marginal costs of abatement at source points
would produce a cost-minimizing solution only if the environmental im-
pact of one unit of discharge were equal for all polluters.16 Given dispari-
ties in impact, the conditions for cost-effectiveness are far more complex.
Compliance with ambient standards can be determined by measuring
environmental quality at various points designated as receptor points. The
aggregate cost of tightening an ambient standard one unit at a given re-
ceptor point is termed the shadow price of pollution at that point. To meet
a preestablished ambient standard at least cost, 7 each polluter's marginal
cost of abatement must equal the sum over all receptor points of the pol-
luter's effect"8 on environmental quality multiplied by the shadow price of
13. Ways to design cost-effective systems of pollution control consistent with preestablished ambi-
ent standards are discussed extensively in the economic literature. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES,
ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 356 (1979); W. BAUMOL & W.
OATES, supra note 11, at 137-39; J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); Tietenberg,
Controlling Pollution by Price and Standard Systems: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 75 SWEDISH
J. ECON. 193 (1973); Walker & Storey, The "Standards and Price" Approach to Pollution Control:
Problems of Iteration, 79 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 99 (1977). Many economists favor a "standards
and prices" approach because it does not require the complex task of estimating the benefits of pollu-
tion abatement. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 11, at 135-37 (determination of
marginal net damages of pollution activities is difficult); cf B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J.
SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 124-35 (1974)
(critically evaluating studies of pollution control benefits). But c. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAG.
ING WATER QUALITY 126-29 (1968) (estimating loss in recreational benefits caused by water
pollution).
14. Tietenberg, supra note 3, at 395.
15. See infra pp. 810, 812.
16. If the marginal costs of abatement for the various polluters are different, and the impact on
environmental quality of one unit of discharge from those polluters is equal, the overall cost of achiev-
ing a standard can be reduced by shifting one unit of pollution from a high cost to a low cost polluter.
17. In this section, the total cost of pollution control is taken to be the sum of the abatement costs
of individual polluters. This approach disregards the effects of pollution control on consumer surplus,
and producers' profits that result from changing product mix and output levels. Assumptions of this
type are common in economic analysis. See, e.g., Baumol & Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices
for Protection of the Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42, 52-53 (1971) (ignoring consumer sur-
plus effects); Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON.
THEORY 395, 398 (1972) (prices of inputs and outputs not associated with pollution unaffected by
measures undertaken to control pollution).
18. The effect of a discharger's impact on environmental quality is determined through the use of
a diffusion matrix, which relates the level of discharges released at a polluter's source point to pollu-
tant concentrations at receptor points. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d
1150, 1160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1973) (describing use of Real-Time Air-Quality
Simulation Model to predict plants' effect on ambient pollution); Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncer-
tain Search for Environmental Policy: Scientific Factfinding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the
Delaware River, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 436-71 (1972) (discussing effect of biochemical oxygen
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pollution." Perfect cost minimization would require estimates of the im-
pact of every discharge source on ambient quality at an infinite number of
receptor points. In practice, however, the effect of sources in a given re-
gion can be spatially aggregated" and compliance with ambient standards
can be measured or modeled at only a few receptor points.
B. The Problems of a Pure Technology-Based Scheme
Setting emission2' and effluent22 standards solely on the basis of availa-
ble technology without taking into account the costs of compliance will not
minimize the costs of achieving ambient standards. Under both the CAA
demand on dissolved oxygen in a stream); Montgomery, supra note 17, at 397 (modeling contribution
of source emitting nonreactive atmospheric pollutants to pollutant concentration at receptor points).
19. The cost minimization condition can be stated mathematically. Assume that the abatement
cost function of a firm at point i discharging pollutants at a level ei is Ci(e.). The impact of a dis-
charge ei on receptor point j is hip, where h i is a diffusion matrix. The amkient standard at pointj
is sj. Then, the cost minimization problem may be stated as
Min 2- Ci(ei)i
s.t. 2 hij ei--s j=[! .. m]
i I i i
ei>O
The Lagrangian function L(el 
. 
, en)=
Ci ( ei) - 2; uj (hij ei - sj )
ij i
where the uj, j = 1, ..., m, are Lagrange multipliers. With ei positive at the optimum, differentiating
with respect to ei leads to the first order conditions for cost minimization:
MCi - .ujhij = 0
where MCi=dCi/dei is the marginal cost of abatement of firm i.
20. Source points are aggregated by adding, for each pollutant, the emissions of each source in a
given region. Cf Tietenberg, Spatially Differentiated Air Pollutant Emission Charges: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 54 LAND ECON. 265 (1978) (defining optimal spatial aggregation for effluent fee
pollution control system).
21. Under the CAA, EPA sets technology-based emission limitations for new stationary sources
and for modifications and reconstructions of existing sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. III 1979); 40
C.F.R. § 60.15 (1981). These limitations reflect "the degree of emission reduction achievable through
the application of the best system of continuous emission reduction . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(1)(C).
In PSD areas, new facilities are subject to stricter technology-based emission limitations. 42 U.S.C. §
7475(a)(4). In addition to these limitations, power plants fired by fossil fuels must achieve a given
percentage reduction in emissions over the levels that would have resulted had such fuels not been
treated prior to combustion. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(A)(ii).
22. The FWPCA imposes technology-based effluent standards on both existing sources, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and new sources, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976). Since 1977, existing
sources have had to meet effluent levels determined by the "best practicable control technology cur-
rently available." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976). After 1983, this level will be determined by
reference to the "best available technology economically achievable." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)
(Supp. III 1979). New sources must meet a standard determined by the "best available demonstrated
control technology." 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (1976).
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and the FWPCA, however, the costs of compliance are to be considered in
setting emission and effluent standards.2 3 The consideration of costs could,
in theory, lead to a crude equalization of marginal costs in a system in
which technology-based emission and effluent standards were the sole
means of achieving ambient environmental quality standards. But the cur-
rent statutory framework, case law, and administrative practice would
preclude cost-effective outcomes even in such a system.24
1. Static Analysis
The CAA and the FWPCA technology-based standards would not pro-
mote cost-effective allocations in the short-run, even if they were the sole
means of achieving ambient standards.25 First, these emission and effluent
standards are set in the absence of inter-industry cost comparisons. 6
There is thus no explicit mechanism for transferring the pollution abate-
ment burden from an industry with high marginal costs of compliance to
23. Under the CAA, costs must be considered setting all new source performance standards. 42
U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979). Under the FWPCA, the effluent limitations for existing
sources that will apply after 1983 will have to be "economically achievable." 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979). Similarly, standards of performance for new sources must "take into
consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction." 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1976). The
FWPCA, however, does not provide for an explicit consideration of costs for pre-1983 standards for
existing sources. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). Under existing case law, however, costs are taken
into account in setting such standards. CPC Int'l v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051 (3d Cir.
1975).
During the House debates on the CAA Amendments of 1970, Representative Ryan proposed that
costs of compliance be ignored: "[Tihe threat to our environment is so great that, as a matter of public
policy, industry should be required to use the most advanced technology regardless of whether or not a
particular industry finds it economically feasible." 116 CONG. REC. 19,242 (1970); see Portland Ce-
ment Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) (quoting Representative Ryan). His proposal was rejected. 486 F.2d at 387 n.47.
24. Empirical studies show that the pollution allocations which result from the use of technology-
based standards depart significantly from least-cost solutions. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 56 &
n.42. The National Commission on Water Quality estimates that 30-35% of the cost of water pollu-
tion control could be saved by the adoption of a cost-minimizing program. Earlier studies estimated
these savings at 100-200%. Id.
25. Such standards do not promote efficient allocations either. See supra pp. 793-94 (distinguish-
ing between cost effectiveness and efficiency). Courts have not required application of cost-benefit tests
aimed at efficiency. According to one court, cost-benefit analysis is not required under the CAA be-
cause "such a requirement would conflict with the specific time constraints imposed on the adminis-
trator," and could not be easily implemented given "[t]he difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying
the benefits to ambient air conditions." Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (footnote omitted). Similarly, a cost-benefit analy-
sis is not required in setting effluent standards for either new or existing sources. CPC Int'l v. Train,
540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); American Meat Inst. v.
EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027,
1059 (3d Cir. 1975).
26. "Inter-industry [cost] comparisons . . . are not generally required, or even productive; and
they were not contemplated by Congress in . . . [the Clean Air] Act." Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Similarly, the
FWPCA contains no provision for inter-industry cost comparisons, and these comparisons have not
been required by the courts.
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one with lower costs.27 Indeed, as a matter of policy, the EPA may impose
stricter regulations on industries with greater financial resources. 2 While
this practice may protect sources of employment, it precludes even an ap-
proximate equalization of marginal costs, unless it is assumed that indus-
tries with greater financial resources also have lower marginal costs of
pollution abatement. There is, however, no evidence to support that
assumption.
Second, standards are set for categories or classes of polluters;29 they are
not tailored to individual processes and abatement cost functions. Given
the variety of such processes, 30 uniform regulations probably impose high-
ly unequal costs of compliance. The pernicious effects of this regulatory
approach are particularly severe under section 301 of the FWPCA,'
which sets uniform effluent standards for plants of widely different ages.32
27. See supra note 16.
28. L. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 14 (1981); cf Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (where costs of meeting
standards would be greater than industry could bear and survive, such standards could not be imple-
mented by industry regardless of technological feasibility).
29. Under the CAA, new source performance standards are set for categories of stationary
sources, and establish "allowable emission limitations for such category of sources." 42 U.S.C. §
741 l(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1979). To date, the EPA has set NSPSs for 34 categories of sources. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.40-60.424 (1981). The first subsection of each NSPS defines the "affected facilities," see
40 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1981), that is, the types of installations to which each standard applies. For exam-
ple, the standards of performance for lime manufacturing plants affect all lime kilns and lime hydra-
tors, but do not affect facilities used to manufacture lime at kraft pulp mills. See National Lime Ass'n
v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 426-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 40 C.F.R. § 60.340 (1981).
Under the FWPCA, the EPA has the authority to limit discharges by existing plants through
industry-wide regulations setting forth uniform effluent limitations. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-36 (1977). This case clarifies an important ambiguity in the statutory
language. While 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979) states that the post-1983 effluent limita-
tions for "categories and classes of point sources" will be achieved through the "application of the best
available technology economically achievable for such category or dass," 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)
(1976) speaks of pre-1983 "effluent limitations for point sources" (emphasis added). Despite the dif-
ference in the language, the Court found that "[niothing elsewhere in the Act . . . suggests any
radical difference in the mechanism used to impose limitations for the 1977 and 1983 deadlines," 430
U.S. at 127, and upheld industry-wide pre-1983 regulations, id. at 136. The Court noted, however,
that some allowance had to be made for "variations in individual plants." Id. at 128. Subsequently,
the D.C. Circuit rejected a broad reading of this variance requirement. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
In setting FWPCA standards for new sources, the EPA must publish a list of categories of sources
and establish standards of performance in each category. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1976). While
EPA "may distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources," 33 U.S.C. §
1316(b)(2), it may not provide variances in setting pre-1983 effluent standards. Du Pont, 430 U.S. at
138-39.
30. If the categories used were reasonably narrow, the setting of standards for categories of
sources could be seen as a tradeoff between the compliance costs of individual polluters and the trans-
action costs of setting individualized standards. The breadth of the categories, however, suggests that
the EPA made no such tradeoff evaluation. Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 60.60 (1981) (same § Ill standards
apply to all types of portland cement plants).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
32. In setting pre-1983 effluent standards, the EPA does consider "age and size of plant . . .
energy requirements and costs," but it allows a discharger to secure a permit containing less stringent
limitations than those promulgated for his "class" only if he can show "that factors related to the
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Third, standards are geographically uniform.33 This uniformity does
not interfere with the equalization of marginal costs at source points, but
it precludes a cost-effective allocation of the pollution burden because the
impact of a given discharge depends on meteorological factors, topogra-
phy, and other physical parameters specific to the discharge points."
Thus, technology-based standards preclude a cost-effective allocation
scheme among polluters, even though the costs of compliance are consid-
ered when these standards are set. In addition, the economic tests applied
to measure the costs of these standards-the "exorbitantly costly" test35
and the "reasonable relation" test"--are not designed to yield cost-effec-
tive results. The "exorbitantly costly" test constrains the overall economic
effect of regulations on an industry by ruling out standards that would
impose grave hardships on affected parties. 7 While it protects weak sec-
tors of the economy, it probably does nothing to eliminate the unnecessary
costs of compliance with ambient standards.
The "reasonable relation" test is applied by comparing the costs and
benefits of abatement, and requiring, in some cases,38 that the cost of
abatement not be "grossly disproportionate" to the corresponding benefit.
A simple comparison of cost and pollution reduction yields a ratio, cost
per unit of pollution reduction, that represents a polluter's average cost of
abatement. Average cost comparisons, however, do not promote cost-mini-
mizing allocations unless the marginal costs of pollution abatement are
constant, 9 and typically, marginal costs increase as pollution abatement
equipment or facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such discharger
are fundamentally different from the factors considered in the establishment of the guidelines."
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1038 (D.C.Cir. 1978).
33. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1316 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. III 1979).
34. See infra pp. 810-12.
35. See, e.g., CPC Int'l v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1343-44 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
966 (1977) (FWPCA); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (CAA); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (same).
36. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975) (EPA should not require gross disproportion between costs and achievable reduction in
emissions).
37. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (tests used to deter-
mine CAA technology-based emission standards should provide "some assurance of the achievability
of the standard for the industry as a whole, given the range of variable factors found relevant to the
standards' achievability"); CPC Int'l v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1342 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977) (requiring thorough study of initial and annual costs of meeting FWPCA standards
and affirmative conclusion that costs can be "reasonably borne" by industry). The "exorbitantly
costly" test, however, is not violated, at least under the FWPCA, when a marginal firm within an
industry has to close down due to the cost of pollution abatement requirements. Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Congress authorized EPA to impose effluent re-
strictions might shut down paper mills).
38. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975).
39. When marginal costs are constant, average costs and marginal costs are equal.
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requirements are made more stringent. 40
In other cases,4 1 the "reasonable relation" test requires that the margi-
nal costs of additional abatement not be "grossly disproportionate" to the
benefits obtained. In this formulation, the test resembles an efficiency test.
The condition for true efficiency, however, is met only when marginal
costs are actually equal to marginal benefits. 42 More importantly, an effi-
ciency test is inappropriate. In a mixed system in which ambient stan-
dards are set independently of economic considerations, a regulator setting
standards for source points should be concerned with cost-effectiveness,
not with efficiency; cost-effectiveness requires only that the regulator allo-
cate, among different polluters, the costs of achieving a benefit, which is
fixed by the ambient standards.43 To make this allocation, the regulator
needs to consider only marginal costs, not benefits. 44
2. Dynamic Analysis
It is conceivable that a pollution abatement program that is not cost-
effective in the short run could produce least-cost long-term results by
forcing the development of superior abatement technology, and thereby
minimizing the aggregate long-term costs of compliance with environmen-
tal regulations.4" To the extent that technology-based standards under the
CAA and the FWPCA have required polluters to reduce their emission
and effluent levels, these standards have forced the introduction of previ-
ously unused technology.4 Technology-based standards are not, however,
an effective means of forcing technological innovation. 7 Because the intro-
duction of new abatement technologies gives regulators a justification for
40. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 13, at 213-14 (1979); Dewees, The Costs and
Technology of Pollution Abatement, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 291, 298-99
(A. Friedlaender ed. 1978).
41. See CPC Int'l v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1977).
42. See supra p. 793.
43. See supra pp. 793-94 (distinguishing between efficiency and cost-effectiveness).
44. If the ambient standards satisfy efficiency conditions, a cost-benefit analysis will identify the
cost-effective allocation of the pollution abatement burden. See supra p. 794 (establishing converse
proposition, that is, conditions under which cost-minimizing allocations are efficient).
45. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1975) ("Over
the long haul, perhaps the most important single criterion on which to judge environmental policies is
the extent to which they spur new technology toward the efficient conservation of environmental
quality.")
46. See, e.g., B. ACKERIAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 11, 15-16 (1981) (new
source performance standards for coal-fired power plants have forced the introduction of scrubbers);
Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979) (describing
technology-forcing in copper smelting and electric power plants).
47. Comparing such standards to standards not based on technology, effluent charges, sale of pol-
lution permits and subsidies, one commentator concludes that technology-based standards "provide the
weakest incentives for. . . abatement technology . . . innovation." Magat, The Effects of Environ-
mental Regulation on Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 21 (1979).
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imposing new and potentially more costly pollution control standards,
firms have a strong disincentive to develop such technologies. "
The only way in which technology-based standards spur innovation is
by creating an expanded market for a firm's successful innovation.49 But
the inherent difficulty in appropriating the benefits of new abatement
technology, and the lag between the discovery of such technology and its
incorporation into regulatory standards, make it unlikely that this incen-
tive will outweigh the powerful disincentive for abatement technology
innovation.50
C. The Current Mixed System
Currently, technology-based standards are only one of the means used
under the CAA and the FWPCA to achieve ambient standards. An eco-
nomic assessment of technology-based standards in this mixed system re-
quires the consideration of a number of factors not relevant to the exami-
nation of a pure technology-based scheme.
1. Setting Air Quality Standards
Under the CAA, two independent decisionmakers regulate emissions in
each air quality control region:"1 the EPA establishes geographically uni-
form limitations for new sources in the technology-based new source per-
formance standard (NSPS) program, 2 and each state sets individualized
48. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 45, at 82-83; Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution
Controls on Stationary Sources under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441,
476 (1975); Freeman, supra note 4, at 57; La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 774 & n.17 (1977); c. Mills & White, Government Poli-
ies Toward Automotive Emissions Control, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 348
(A. Friedlaender ed. 1978) (incentives for private parties to develop methods for controlling automo-
bile emissions have been badly distorted).
Technology-based standards not only fail to force new technology, they can also produce negative
results if they are improperly implemented. First, if their lead times are too short, they will "force"
the introduction of quick, costily technologies that have a high probability of success, thus locking in
potentially inferior technologies. Second, if the EPA fails to prosecute those who adopt the technology
relied on by the agency when it sets the standards, but who do not meet the prescribed emission or
effluent standards, it will eliminate incentives for changes in a firm's production technology that could
lead to lower emissions but that might make prosecution more likely if the standards are not met. See
Freeman, supra note 4, at 56 (while firms can use alternative technologies to meet effluent standards,
enforcement incentives lead them to install technology suggested by EPA). Third, if the standards are
also coupled with special requirements, they will further discourage technological innovation. See B.
ACKEIMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46, at 32 n.19 (percentage treatment requirement for coal-
fired power plants discourages development of technologies that meet emission standard but fail to
meet specified levels of percentage reduction).
49. Magat, supra note 47, at 18.
50. Id.
51. The EPA can designate as an air quality control region "any interstate area or major intra-
state area which [it] deems necessary or appropriate for the attainment and maintenance of ambient
air quality standards." 42 U.S.c. § 7407(c) (Supp. 111 1979).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. III 1979).
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limitations for existing sources in a state implementation plan (SIP).53
The CAA does not require any comparison of the emission reduction costs
for new and existing sources.5 4
This regulatory structure, with its two independent decisionmakers,
cannot be cost-effective because there is no adjustment mechanism ena-
bling regulators to amend emission standards when the allocation of the
costs of reducing pollution departs from the cost-minimizing solution. The
EPA cannot perform this adjustment because it is required to impose geo-
graphically uniform NSPS standards.55 Since the effects of pollution vary
geographically," the EPA cannot match the marginal costs of abatement
for new sources with the marginal costs of abatement for existing sources.
States are also limited in their ability to set cost-effective emission stan-
dards. Pursuant to section 116 of the CAA,17 states may adopt emission
standards for new sources that are more stringent than the NSPSs set by
the EPA." Thus, if the marginal costs of compliance are systematically
lower for new sources than for existing sources, states can seek to attain
cost-effective solutions within their jurisdictions by setting more stringent
standards for new sources.5 9 But because they do not have the statutory
authority to adopt emission standards for new sources less stringent than
those imposed by the EPA, states cannot set cost-effective standards when
new source marginal costs are not systematically lower than those of ex-
isting sources. And when new source marginal costs are systematically
higher than those of existing sources, states cannot reduce the unnecessary
costs of compliance at all.
In practical terms, section 116 does little to reduce long-term costs.
First, empirical evidence suggests that the marginal costs of compliance
are typically higher for new sources."0 Second, since the EPA sets NSPSs
at frequent but irregular intervals,"' attempting to adjust marginal costs
would be a continuous and administratively impractical process. Third,
states that set standards for new sources more stringent than NSPSs place
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. III 1979). SIP limitations are not technology-based.
54. The FWPCA also imposes different standards on new and existing sources. Compare 33
U.S.C. § 1311, 1316 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (existing sources) with 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976) (new
sources). But since both sets of standards are imposed by a single decision-maker, the EPA, an explicit
comparison of emission reduction costs for new and existing plants could be performed.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
56. See infra pp. 810-11.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. III 1979).
58. If an NSPS is in effect, a state "may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation
which is less stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan." 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. III
1979).
59. If marginal costs were systematically lower for new sources, and states did, as a result, make
cost-effective adjustments under § 116 for all new sources, there would be effectively one regulator
rather than two, a unitary sytem rather than a mixed system.
60. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46, at 67.
61. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40-.424 (1981).
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themselves at a disadvantage in attempting to attract new industry. 2
2. Setting Water Quality Standards
The mixed scheme of the FWPCA is economically undesirable for dif-
ferent reasons. Unlike the CAA, the FWPCA relies on technology-based
standards as its primary mode of regulation for both new and existing
plants. 3 Adjustments to effluent levels for existing sources are made, pur-
suant to section 301(b)(1)(C)1 4 or 302,"1 only when the resulting water
quality fails to meet preestablished ambient standards. The FWPCA
scheme is thus closer than the CAA scheme to a pure technology-based
system. It still differs from such a system, however, since adjustments re-
sult in effluent standards more stringent than the technology-based stan-
dards for comparable sources.
These adjustments are not performed in a cost-effective manner. Under
section 301(b)(1)(C) there is no mechanism for even attempting a cost-
effectiveness analysis." Adjustments under section 302 cannot be imple-
mented if a party affected by the stricter effluent limitation shows that
"there is no reasonable relationship between the economic and social costs
and the benefits to be obtained.' 7 But such a cost-benefit test is inappro-
priate in this context; it will not yield a cost-effective allocation, or even a
cost-effective adjustment. A consideration of benefits in applying section
302 might shed some light on whether the water quality standards are
efficient.'8 It could also justify a decision that water quality standards
62. See infra pp. 806-08.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976) (pre-1983 standards for existing sources); 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(E) (Supp. III 1979) (post-1983 standards for existing sources); 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1976)
(new source standards).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976). Under this provision, more stringent effluent limitations
are adopted when necessary to "meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of
compliance" established under state or federal laws or regulations. Id.; see Porter County Chapter of
Izaak Walton League v. Costle, 571 F.2d 359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978) (federal
standards); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979) (state standards).
These water quality standards are proposed by the states and approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. §
1313(a)(1) (1976). If the EPA does not approve the state proposals, and the state refuses to accept the
EPA's recommendations, the agency can promulgate its own standards. Id.; see Mississippi Comm'n
on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). Adjustments are made pursuant to this provision when the water
quality obtained through the imposition of effluent limitations is not sufficient to attain the goals of
the FWPCA. See Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1285 (D.S.D. 1979) (§ 302
applies only when implementation of effluent limitations interferes with attainment of federal "fisha-
ble/swimmable" goal); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) (setting out federal water quality goals).
66. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.S.D. 1979) ("[E]ffluent limita-
tions are established by individual examination of the waterway and. . . [a] hearing. . . to consider
costs . . . is not necessary.")
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2) (1976).
68. If the marginal costs of adopting stricter § 302 standards exceed the marginal benefits of
higher water quality for all possible allocations of effluent discharges among polluters, those water
quality standards are stricter than efficient ones. Conversely, if marginal benefits exceed marginal
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should not be met if the cost of doing so is too high. But a cost-benefit test
will not, in general, identify the least-cost way of meeting water quality
standards.69 Moreover, such a test is inadequate even as a measure of the
efficiency of effluent standards. First, it does not evaluate the efficiency of
the effluent limitation itself, but only the efficiency of the departure from
the standards that would otherwise be in place. Second, it does not require
an equalization of marginal costs and marginal benefits; a finding that
total costs are not exorbitant when compared with total benefits probably
satisfies the statutory requirements."
II. Non-Economic Considerations
That technology-based standards do not promote the achievement of
ambient standards at least cost does not, by itself, compel the conclusion
that technology-based standards are undesirable under the current mixed
system. Indeed, non-economic considerations should also play an impor-
tant role in the choice of environmental policy. Despite the strong claims
of supporters, however, technology-based standards are undesirable even
from a non-economic standpoint. They are a poor means of supplement-
ing ambient standards, they do not promote the equitable allocation of the
pollution burden among states, and they do not ease enforcement
problems.
A. Additional Environmental Protection
Supporters of the use of technology-based emission and effluent stan-
dards in conjunction with ambient standards argue that a mixed system
provides greater environmental protection than ambient standards alone."
In addition, proponents of technology-based standards argue that such
standards provide an additional margin of safety and prevent the deterio-
ration of ambient quality in areas that surpass the minimum level man-
dated by the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 72
costs, social welfare could be increased through the implementation of more stringent standards.
69. A determination of cost-effectiveness depends solely on consideration of costs, not on a com-
parison of costs and benefits. See supra p. 799.
70. When similar tests have been applied under the CAA and the FWPCA, however, courts have
found pollution control regulations invalid only in cases of gross disparities. See supra pp. 798-99.
71. Testimony of David G. Hawkins on Behalf of the National Clean Air Coalition Before the
United States Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 1 (June 2, 1981) (on file with
Yale Law Journal); Ayres, supra note 48, at 470 & n.91.
72. Because they can provide some additional environmental protection, technology-based emission
or effluent standards could be used to improve upon the efficiency of ambient standards. Indeed, if it
could be determined that making a given ambient standard more stringent would increase social sur-
plus, and if this ambient standard could not tightened because of political considerations, the addi-
tional protection provided by technology-based standards might be an acceptable way of increasing
social surplus. Assuming that particular industries are concentrated in certain parts of the country, the
EPA could impose relatively more stringent technology-based standards on industries located in areas
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1. Margin of Safety
Former EPA Assistant Administrator David Hawkins claims that "as
new well-controlled sources replace old ones," the NSPS program will
promote "progress toward known environmental objectives beyond that
provided by the ambient standards program."' 3 Similarly, Senator Mus-
kie, the sponsor of the CAA, views the technology-based effluent standards
as objectives per se, and not as a means to achieve ambient water quality
goals.74
Technology-based emission and effluent standards are, however, a hap-
hazard means of providing an additional margin of safety. Because they
do not limit the number of plants that can be built in areas that meet
ambient standards, they do not provide any specific margin of safety in
those areas.7" Moreover, in areas that barely meet or do not meet ambient
standards, technology-based standards provide no additional protection.
Also, the existence of strict technology-based standards for new sources
may allow states to amend their SIPs,76 relaxing the emission standards
for existing sources," while still meeting ambient standards. This posture
in which ambient standards are too lax, thereby increasing social efficiency. There is, however, no
evidence that technology-based standards are used to promote this efficiency objective.
73. Testimony of David G. Hawkins, supra note 71, at 4. According to Hawkins, the NSPS
program provides a "safety net." Id. This safety net should not be confused with the margin of safety
used in the determination of national primary air quality standards pursuant to § 109 of the CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). That statutory margin of safety is already incorporated into the
ambient standard; the "safety net" is intended to provide still further protection.
74. Freeman, supra note 4, at 48-49. Given that the "fishable/swimmable" goals of the FWPCA,
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976), will not come into effect until 1983, and that Homestake Mining Co.
v. EPA, 477 F. Sup. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979), appears to be the only reported case in which the
EPA had to include more stringent state water quality standards as part of a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, Muskie's characterization appears to be accurate.
The legislative history of the FWPCA lends support to this view:
[Section 301] clearly establishes that the discharge of pollutants is unlawful. Unlike its pred-
ecessor program which permitted the discharge of certain amounts of pollutants. . . this legis-
lation would clearly establish that no one has the right to pollute-that pollution continues
because of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the nation's waterways
for the purpose of disposing of wastes.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3668, 3709.
75. This inadequacy is implicitly acknowledged by Hawkins: "We will degrade our air quality
unless we improve pollution reduction technology at least as fast as we grow." Testimony of David G.
Hawkins, supra note 71, at 5.
76. SIPs can be amended with relative ease. See Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 95 (1975) (revi-
sion will qualify for approval if it satisfies general requirements applicable to original implementation
plans); Mission Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); 40 C.F.R. § 51.6(c)
(1981) (same).
77. Such a policy was proposed in § 4 of the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 256 (1974) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. III
1979)), which encouraged states to loosen limitations for existing sources that might result in emission
levels more stringent than those needed to meet NAAQS. See Ayres, supra note 48, at 469 n.88. But
f. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Fri v. Sierra
Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973) (invalid to permit states to submit plans which allow pollution levels to
rise to secondary ambient standard). In response to Sierra Club, Congress established the nondeteri-
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could neutralize any environmental benefit that technology-based stan-
dards might otherwise have provided.
In fact, technology-based standards under the CAA may actually have
perverse effects on ambient air quality. Ackerman and Hassler point out
that by increasing the cost of constructing new plants, the NSPS program
gives polluters an economic incentive to run their old plants longer than
they might otherwise s.7  Since existing plants often pollute a great deal
more than new plants, NSPSs that are too strict can thus increase, rather
than decrease, total emissions.79
Thus, any additional protection that technology-based standards can
provide in the short-run by controlling the level of discharges at a given
plant will probably disappear in the long-run. If the present ambient
standards do not provide sufficient environmental protection, the logical
remedy is to modify those standards to provide additional safety. An estab-
lished optimal margin is preferable to a random and ever-changing one.
2. Preventing Enviromental Deterioration
Related to the margin of safety argument is the argument that technol-
ogy-based standards prevent the deterioration of areas whose ambient
quality is better than that mandated by ambient standards."' This argu-
ment is reflected in the legislative history of the CAA,"' and is further
articulated by Judge McGowan in National Asphalt Pavement Associa-
tion v. Train."
oration provisions of the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. III 1979). Following these
amendments to the CAA, SIPs can once again allow pollutant levels to rise in non-PSD areas, and in
PSD areas, provided that doing so does not lead to a violation of the allowable increments over emis-
sion levels. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. III 1979).
78. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46, at 68 (discussing "old plant effect").
79. Id. For example, coal-fired utilities often produce between three and four times as much sul-
fur dioxide as new ones. Thus, "[e]ven if a small fraction of old plants are induced to stay on line for
an extended period, the overall impact could be quite serious." Id. Ackerman and Hassler calculate
that stricter 1977 NSPSs forcing all new plants to "scrub" emissions will cause the Midwest to im-
pose 170,000 more tons of sulfur dioxide on the East than it would have under the previous NSPS.
Id. But see Testimony of David G. Hawkins, supra note 71, at 8 (challenging Ackerman and Hass-
ler's e timates of impact of "old plant effect").
80. E.g., Ayres, supra note 48, at 470 (without technology-based emission standards, polluters
might defile areas with better air quality than that required by NAAQS). Ayres points out, however,
that PSD requirements would curb this tendency. Id. at 470 n.92.
81. The House Report stated that § 111 was enacted to "prevent the occurrence anywhere in the
United States of significant new air pollution problems. . . ." H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 31, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5356, 5358. The Senate report presented
a similar view: "Maintenance of existing high quality air is assured through provision for maximum
control of new major pollution sources." S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). Senator
Muskie, one of the bill's managers, stated that "[t]hose areas which have levels of air quality which
are better than the national standards should not find their air quality degraded by the construction of
new sources." 116 CONG. REC. 32,902 (1970).
82. "[Tlhe Clean Air Act, and section 111 in particular, was also designed to prevent new pollu-
tion problems, especially the deterioration of air quality in areas where existing air quality levels
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Despite its initial acceptance, the nondeterioration argument is pro-
foundly flawed. It should be clear that a program that limits the emissions
of an individual polluter but does not limit the number of new sources
that can be constructed in a given area does not guarantee any specific
level of air quality in that area. Indeed, a high industrial growth rate will
cause the deterioration of environmental quality despite the presence of
strict technology-based standards.
The inability of the NSPS program to prevent significant deterioration
was implicitly acknowledged by the EPA when it adopted Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations, 3 and by Congress when it
added a specific PSD provision to the CAA. 4 The PSD program reflects
Congressional recognition that despite the existence of technology-based
standards, the adoption of more stringent ambient standards was neces-
sary to prevent further environmental deterioration."5
B. Equitable Allocation
Although the geographical uniformity of technology-based standards is
a significant impediment to the cost-effective achievement of ambient stan-
dards,"6 proponents of technology-based standards argue that uniformity
promotes regional equity. In their view, it prevents states from competing
for industry by adopting lax environmental standards for new plants."
This argument played a central role in the congressional debates that pre-
ceded the enactment of section 111 of the CAA.88
But geographically uniform technology-based standards do little to pre-
exceed the promulgated air quality standards." 539 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510 (1974).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. III 1979). The legislative history of the PSD amendments to
the CAA also implies that § 111 is inadequate for preventing deterioration: "This section has been
developed to provide dearer definition of the nearly decade-old policy. . . that significant deteriora-
tion of dean air must be avoided, and to provide more specific congressional guidance as to how this
policy is to be implemented." H.R. REP. NO. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 103, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1182.
85. PSD "allowable increments" are ambient standards. See supra note 3; infra note 92.
86 See supra pp. 798, 801.
87. E.g., Ayres & Doniger, New Source Standard for Power Plants II: Consider the Law, 3
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 66 (1979).
88. The House Report explicitly stated that "[tihe promulgation of Federal emission standards for
new sources . . . will preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other in trying to
attract new plants and facilities." H.R. REP. NO. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5358. This view was expressed once again in 1977, when Congress consid-
ered amendments to the CAA:
The national new source best technology emission standards were thus intended to meet this
need, to avoid situations in which industries could be lured to one State by relaxing emission
standards or deadlines and away from other States with stricter standards. Similarly, such
national standards requiring use of best practicable control technology were supposed to avoid
favoring some areas of the country over others with respect to new sources.
H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 184, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1263.
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vent situations in which environmental regulation systematically gives cer-
tain regions a comparative advantage over other regions. In the absence of
ambient standards, a pure technology-based system allows every region to
attract industry that can adhere to the prescribed technology-based stan-
dards, but favors those regions in which such standards can be met at a
lower cost. 9 The current mixed system produces even more inequities.
Technology-based emission and effluent standards merely control the dis-
charges of a given source; they do not limit the number of sources that
may be built in a region that meets ambient standards. Regions that
barely meet, or do not meet,90 ambient standards can attract new industry
only at the expense of setting more restrictive standards for existing
sources. 9t By contrast, regions with high environmental quality can com-
pete more successfully for industry, because they can more easily accom-
modate new plants.92
89. A polluter facing different costs for the attainment of a uniform emission standard will, other
things being equal, choose the location where these costs are lower. Thus, a definition of equity based
on equal units of emissions rather than comparable costs systematically discriminates against states in
which the relevant costs of meeting emission standards are high.
An interesting discussion of the blatant use of new source performance standards to promote re-
gional protectionism is provided in B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46, at 44-48 (only
unambiguous benefit gained by requiring all coal-fired plants to use scrubbers was protection of mar-
kets for high sulfur Eastern and Midwestern coal).
90. Under the CAA, a state that is eager to attract new industry but that barely meets ambient
standards could amend its SIP to decrease the emissions of existing stationary sources. See supra note
77. In contrast, under the FWPCA, states may prescribe effluent standards stricter than those promul-
gated by the EPA only to attain a higher level of water quality. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976).
Thus, they may not impose stricter emission standards on existing sources for the sole purpose of
setting aside a larger pollution budget for new sources.
In non-attainment areas (areas that do not meet at least one of the NAAQS), new plants may be
constructed under the CAA only if the proposed source complies with an emission standard based on
"lowest achievable emission rate," and if decreases in the emissions of existing sources are at least as
great as the emissions of the new source. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. III 1979).
91. It is true that in the absence of uniform NSPSs, such regions could be expected to compete for
new industry by setting stringent standards for existing sources and comparatively lax standards for
new sources. Existing plants are "captive"; their owners have substantial investments that cannot
easily be moved. By contrast, plants still in the planning stage can be transferred from one region to
another with relative ease. Hence, regions have an incentive to shift pollution control responsibility to
old plants in order to attract new plants. While uniform NSPSs preclude this type of regional compe-
tition, other policies, including the market system proposed in this Note, see infra pp. 811-12, would
also prevent regions that barely meet or do not meet ambient standards from attempting to compete
for new plants at the expense of existing sources.
92. It is true that under the CAA, many regions with air quality that exceeds NAAQS are subject
to additional PSD requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. III 1979). PSD provisions limit the allowa-
ble increase in the concentration of pollutants in "clean air" areas. These requirements are thus
equivalent to ambient standards more stringent than the NAAQS. Until the entire PSD increment is
used, however, even these tougher ambient standards do not act as constraints on regions meeting the
NAAQS.
Under the FWPCA, regions with water quality that exceeds ambient standards are not subject to
additional constraints. In fact, at present, few ambient standards act as environmental constraints. See
La Pierre, supra note 48, at 807. Once the 1983 "fishable/swimmable" goal comes into effect, how-
ever, water quality considerations will constrain emission discharges in many streams. See Davis &
Glasser, The Discharge Permit Program under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972-Improvement of Water Quality through the Regulation of Discharges from Industrial Facili-
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The regional inequities that concerned Congress can be most easily
eliminated by establishing more stringent ambient standards in regions
that have the comparative advantage of a higher level of environmental
quality. Inequities in the allocation of future pollution abatement burdens
can be eliminated entirely if ambient standards are set so as to constrain
the further deterioration of environmental quality in all regions.93
C. Enforcement
When Congress passed the CAA and the FWPCA, it believed their
technology-based emission and effluent standards would ease the enforce-
ment difficulties94 encountered under previous pollution control laws,'"
which did not limit individual discharges. But from an enforcement stand-
point, any allocation mechanism that specifies the maximum allowable
discharges for each polluter is functionally equivalent.96 In technology-
based systems, as in approaches based on the auctioning of pollution per-
mits or on command and control regulations, the enforcing agency must
ensure that each polluter's discharges do not exceed permissible levels.
Under an effluent fee approach, it must ensure that each polluter com-
putes its fee on the basis of its total discharges. In each case, enforcement
depends on monitoring discharge levels.
In practice, technology-based standards may seem to simplify enforce-
ment. The National Commission on Water Quality found that "in many
cases, the abatement [technology] which is actually being installed is
equivalent to the suggested technologies, rather than being designed to
meet the limitations."" Firms may reason that, even if they do not meet
ties, 2 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 179, 223 (1974).
93. This approach has been followed by the PSD program. Ironically, the same House Report
that hailed the equity benefits of technology-based standards, see supra note 88, conceded that
[a]bandonment of a policy of prevention of significant deterioration will encourage flight of
industry-and jobs-from areas where pollution levels are approaching or exceed the mini-
mum Federal standards to cleaner areas. . .. There exists a strong incentive. . . for industry
to "shop around" for States or localities with large clean air resources.
H. REP. NO. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1212
(emphasis omitted).
94. See EPA v. California ex rel State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03
(1976) (difficult to enforce standards governing conduct of individual polluters under regulatory ap-
proach prior to 1972); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(1972 amendments to FWPCA emphasize direct control of polluting sources); NRDC v. EPA, 478
F.2d 875, 885 (1st Cir. 1973) (effective enforcement of specific emission standards was primary goal
of 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 45, at 39; Ayres, supra
note 48, at 451.
95. These previous control programs included: Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81
Stat. 485 (1967) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979)); Water Quality Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979)).
96. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 40, at 308.
97. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 56.
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effluent limitations, they will be free from EPA prosecution as long as
they have adopted the technology used by the EPA in establishing the
standards." If the EPA does not bring enforcement actions against such
firms, it will ease its enforcement burden, but only at the expense of im-
properly treating technology-based standards as design standards." When
applied according to the requirements of the law, technology-based emis-
sion and effluent standards are no easier to enforce than any other scheme
that depends upon the monitoring of discharge levels.
III. Transferable Zoned Pollution Permits: An Alternative Means of
Meeting Ambient Standards
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, under the CAA and the
FWPCA, technology-based standards inhibit the achievement of ambient
standards at least cost; they also fail to provide a desirable margin of
safety, an equitable regional allocation of the pollution abatement burden,
or any special enforcement advantages. The current mixed system of stan-
dard setting should therefore yield to a unitary policy that would achieve
ambient standards at least cost.
Such a policy could be implemented through direct regulation, the im-
positon of effluent fees, or the transfer of pollution permits at prices deter-
mined by market transactions. Direct regulation, however, can only be
cost-effective if the marginal cost functions of all polluters are known.1°°
Similarly, setting cost-effective effluent fees"°' also requires knowledge of
each firm's marginal cost functions.02 It is, of course, possible to obtain
this information by setting the fee at an arbitrary level, observing the re-
sponse of polluters, and adjusting the tax until the desired level of dis-
98. Id. at 56-57.
99. Design standards, which specify the technology to be used, cannot be applied under the sec-
tions of the FWPCA relevant to this Note, and can only be employed under § 111 of the CAA when
it is not feasible to prescribe a technology-based emission standard. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h) (Supp. III
1979). Cf Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 286-87 (1978) (work practice stan-
dard is not emission standard).
100. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 11, at 139.
101. Effluent fees have been advocated widely in the theoretical literature, especially in the con-
text of water quality control. See, e.g., Brill, Revelle, & Liebman, An Effluent Charge Schedule: Cost,
Financial Burden and Punitive Effects, 15 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 993 (1979); Ferrar, Pro-
gressive Taxation as a Policy for Water Quality Management, 9 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 563
(1973); Upton, Optimal Taxing of Water Pollution, 4 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 865 (1968); see
also D. DEWEE, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 133 (1974) (advocating effluent fees to control
automobile emissions); Mills & White, supra note 48, at 385-400 (same). But c Rose-Ackerman,
Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CANADIAN J. ECON. 512 (1973) (case for effluent fees has been
overstated because of failure to analyze implementation complexities). Effluent fees have not been used
in the United States for air or water quality control. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 40, at 256,
263. A few European countries, however, have instituted pollution control systems based on fees. Id.
at 256-58.
102. If geographical and inter-regional effects are ignored the optimal tax levied on a unit of
discharge is the shadow price of the ambient standard. See supra pp. 794-95.
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charges is attained. 103 This iterative procedure does not guarantee, how-
ever, that the desired standard will ever be achieved." ' Moreover, even
when a cost-effective equilibrium exists, the convergence to the desired
solution may be extremely costly.'05 In contrast to both direct regulation
and effluent fees, no knowledge of cost functions is required to set up
markets for the transfer of pollution permits.10 Because this strategy
places specific limits on discharges, the desired ambient standard can be
obtained without the costly iterations often needed to implement an efflu-
ent fee schedule.10 7
Ambient quality levels depend not only on the total amount of dis-
charge but also on the geographical location of polluters.0 8 For example,
depending upon the degree of natural cleansing along the length of a
river, a firm that emits waste into the upper parts of that river may do
either more or less damage to the community than one that discharges the
same amount of effluent downstream.0 9 Similarly, a sulfur dioxide emis-
sion downwind from a mountain range will have an effect on a far wider
area than a similar emission upwind from a physical barrier. Thus, a
single market for pollution rights cannot ensure that ambient standards
will be met at each point within the region defined by that market," 0 and
is therefore inadequate as a strategy to combat local pollution."' More-
over, the trading of rights in a single market can lead to systematic trans-
103. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 11, at 138.
104. Walker & Storey, supra note 13, at 100-01.
105. If many trials are required before convergence occurs, "it is likely that for long periods the
standard will either be over-achieved, resulting in unnecessary expenditure, or under-achieved, result-
ing in environmental losses to society." Id. at 101. In addition, changes in the tax rate may "lock-in"
inferior technologies by altering the relative desirability of available processes, "so that in the ex ante
position a different technology would be adopted from the one actually installed; but in the ex post
position the expected cost savings do not justify a shift." Id. at 103.
106. Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weak-
nesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 383, 390 (1977).
107. Id.
108. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 11, at 144-47; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 101, at
515; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 106, at 392.
109. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 11, at 145. The upsteam emissions may be less dam-
aging than those downstream if the upper part of the river is sufficiently unpolluted to permit natural
processes to disperse or degrade a considerable portion of the wastes before anyone is affected by
them. Conversely, if there is little natural cleansing of the upstream discharges, they may well be
more costly to society than discharges into the lower parts of the river. Id.
110. Under the CAA, for example, the air quality within the "entire geographic" area of a state
has to meet the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (Supp. III 1979). Cf United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,
605 F.2d 283, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (failure to meet ambient
standard at monitoring point justified nonattainment designation for entire area).
111. A single market is adequate to combat the global effects of pollution, that is, effects brought
about by changes in the composition of the atmosphere, since it can serve to limit the total level of
discharges. Currently, a great deal of attention is focused on one such global problem, acid rain, see B.
ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 46, at 66, and a market solution based on the sale of permits
has been proposed, see [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 837. The current ambient-based environmental
policy, however, combats local, rather than global, effects of pollution. Tietenberg, The Design of
Property Rights for Air-Pollution Control, 22 PUB. POL'Y 275, 281 (1974).
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fers to one or more preferred locations, causing the ambient quality in
those locations to deteriorate. The transfer of rights among emission loca-
tions can thus lead to a violation of ambient standards, even though the
total quantity of pollutants emitted within the market area remains
unchanged.
The shortcomings of a single rights market can be remedied through a
zoned rights system. Under such a system, air and water space would be
divided into a number of market regions. A prospective polluter would be
required to purchase a quantity of pollution rights, determined by the
magnitude of its impact on ambient quality. The polluter would be re-
quired to purchase such rights not only in the market region into which it
planned to discharge pollution, but in all regions in which its discharges
would affect ambient quality. The polluter's impact on ambient quality in
each region would be computed through mathematical modeling of the
physical processes involved. Such models are already employed," 2 and
their accuracy can be expected to improve as their use becomes wide-
spread."'3 As markets within each region reach a competitive equilibrium,
the zoned rights scheme should result in the least-cost allocation of the
pollution burden that is consistent with a given set of ambient
standards."14
112. See supra pp. 794-95. For the sake of mathematical tractability, most theoretical studies
assume a linear relationship between discharges and changes in ambient concentrations. E.g., Mont-
gomery, supra note 17, at 397; Tietenberg, supra note 111, at 288.
The air quality models upon which a zoned rights program would need to rely have come under
considerable criticism, see, e.g., Statement on Behalf of Ohio Power Co. Before EPA 3 (June 18,
1981) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (brief for administrative hearing) (effect of emissions on air
quality in distant areas is poorly understood), but have been upheld by the courts, see Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1161 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978). The
possible lack of reliability of these models is not a problem that affects zoned rights schemes alone.
Indeed, the same models are currently employed to determine compliance with ambient standards.
Statement on Behalf of Ohio Power Before EPA, supra, at 1.
113. C 215 SCIENCE 881 (1982) (reporting first use in U.S. of trace element analysis to identify
distant pollution sources).
114. The cost function of a firm at point i discharging pollutants at a level ei is C. (e-). The firm
needs to possess a permit that sells in the market at a price p. for each unit of discharge that reaches
region j. The cost minimization problem for that firm may ie stated as
Min Ci (ei) + 2 pjeihijJ
s.t. ei0
The first order conditions obtained by differentiating with respect to ei are:
MCi - . pjhij = 0
J
where MCi = dCi/dei is the firm's marginal cost of abatement, and hii is a diffusion matrix. This
condition is equivalent to the societal cost-minimization condition. See supra note 19. Thus, a market-
able permit system can produce a cost-effective allocation.
Given the definition of costs employed in this Note, see supra note 17, it follows that the competi-
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This scheme differs from other proposed zoned rights systems in that it
can take into account not only the differences in a polluter's impact on
environmental quality that result from its geographical position, but also
the inter-regional effects of pollution that a polluter at a given location
can control."' For example, by increasing its stack height a polluter will
decrease the impact of a unit of discharge on pollutant concentration in
the zones immediately adjoining the point of discharge, while it will in-
crease the impact of such a unit on more distant zones. 1 6 A model that
ignores these effects would lead to violations of ambient standards.
If universal compliance with ambient standards were required, a zoned
rights scheme would require an infinite number of market regions, each of
infinitesimal area. Otherwise, trading could lead to concentrations violat-
ing ambient standards. As the universal compliance requirement is re-
laxed, however, the permissible area of each zone increases. This relation-
ship defines a tradeoff between the transaction costs of setting up markets
for the sale of pollution rights and the environmental benefit of uniform
ambient levels.'"7 Defining optimal size for water or air quality regions is
beyond the scope of this Note, but it is assumed that a significant degree
of uniformity can be achieved without sacrificing, through increased trans-
action costs, the advantages of a market system.
A zoned rights scheme can probably be implemented without great dif-
ficulty. Indeed, one of its two major components, a permit system, is
tive equilibrium reached under a zoned rights scheme will result in the cost-minimizing allocation.
115. Under Montgomery's pollution license scheme, see Montgomery, supra note 17, dischargers
purchase rights to cause a specified level of ambient pollution. The effect of a unit of emission at a
source point on ambient quality at receptor points is determined through the use of a diffusion matrix.
Montgomery assumes that this diffusion matrix is an array of parameters over which the polluter has
no control. See id. at 397-98. Thus, his model does not account for the inter-regional effects that a
polluter can control.
Tietenberg proposes a scheme that relates discharges at any point to air quality in a zone that
barely meets ambient standards. See Tietenberg, supra note 111. The quantity of emissions a firm
may discharge depends both on the firm's location and on the number of rights it has purchased. This
scheme is conceptually equivalent to Montgomery's.
Rose-Ackerman proposes dividing a river into reaches, allocating a fixed number of rights to each
reach, and prohibiting rights transfers between zones. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 106, at 392-93.
This scheme is equivalent to Tietenberg's and Montgomery's only if the ambient standard acts as a
constraint at all points in the river. If these standards are not constraining, the number of rights
allocated to a given reach has to be recomputed each time an upstream polluter has an impact on that
reach.
116. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SULFUR OXIDES 12 (1978) (tall stacks favor long-distance
transport of emitted sulfur dioxide). Current law allows sources to emit a greater volume of pollutants
if they use tall stacks. 42 Fed. Reg. 57,460 (1977). But see 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (Supp. III 1979) (credit
for stack height ceases when height exceeds "good engineering practice," defined as 2.5 times the
height of source). The incentive to use tall stacks aggravates the pollution problem in areas distant
from pollution sources.
117. The transaction costs of setting up markets may be lower than the costs of promulgating
technology-based standards. The setting of these standards requires that the regulator, in seeking to
define the type of technology on which standards will be based, duplicate industry's search for pollu-
tion abatement technologies. This duplication is an inefficient use of scarce bureaucratic resources.
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firmly entrenched in the regulatory structures of both the CAA and the
FWPCA.' The other major component, market transactions, is already
utilized to a limited extent under the CAA."9
Conclusion
A zoned pollution rights scheme should replace the current technology-
based emission and effluent standards as the primary means for achieving
GAA and FWPCA ambient standards. Because ambient standards already
exist, cost-effective regulations can be implemented without provoking an
acrimonious political and scientific debate over desirable environmental
targets. While there may be compelling reasons to use technology-based
standards to limit discharges of pollutants for which ambient standards
have not been set, ' there is little reason to use them in conjunction with
ambient standards.
Both the CAA and the FWPCA may undergo substantial changes in
the next few years.121 In particular, the EPA is apparently considering
placing more emphasis on ambient water quality goals.122 As long as am-
bient standards are the focus of air and water quality regulation, market
strategies such as the one proposed in this Note should be seriously con-
sidered as cost-effective means for achieving those standards.
118. Effluent discharges under the FWPCA are enforced by means of NPDES permits. NRDC v.
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a) (1976). The CAA contains a
similar enforcement strategy. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7475(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979); Roberts
& Farrell, The Political Economy of Implementation, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLU-
TION 160 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978).
119. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 494-95 (2d ed. 1978)
(offset policy creates market in pollution rights giving existing sources incentive to reduce emissions
and sell right to pollute to new sources); Calvo y Gonzales, Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects
of Controlled Trading, 5 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 399-404 (offsets, banking and bubble concepts
create markets in pollution rights); Freeman, supra note 4, at 39 (same).
120. For example, toxic pollutants are regulated solely by means of technology-based standards.
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (Supp. III 1979) (water quality); 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. 1111979) (air quali-
ty). It may be inappropriate to attempt to define ambient standards for toxic pollutants, since such
standards define a maximum concentration level and permit concentrations below that level. See
Tietenberg, supra note 3, at 396. If even minute concentrations of a toxic pollutant can cause appreci-
able health damage, no concentration level may be acceptable. Thus, this Note does not recommend
that all technology-based standards be replaced by market rights schemes.
121. See AMERICAN ENTER. INST., supra note 6 (CAA revisions); [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
837 (FWPCA revisions). The General Accounting Office has recently proposed a market-based air
pollution control scheme. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A MARKET APPROACH TO AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL COULD REDUCE COMPLIANCE COSTS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING CLEAN AIR
GOALS (1982). This proposal, however, is flawed because it superimposes a market system on existing
NSPS standards, see id. at 42, thereby ruling out cost-minimizing solutions in which the emissions of
some polluters are higher than NSPS levels and adding the transaction costs of a market scheme to
those of the existing technology-based system.
122. Id.
